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NOTES
The IRS, Discrimination, and Religious Schools:
Does the Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure Exact Too
High a Price?
I. Introduction
When the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) published a Proposed Revenue
Procedure (PRP) in August of 19781 to revoke the tax exempt status of racially
discriminatory private schools, the outcry was immediate, fervent, and
widespread. The IRS, the White House, and the members of Congress re-
ceived an estimated half million letters protesting the IRS's plan. 2 Spurred by
the uproar from their constituents, congressmen introduced a host of bills to
stop, delay, or curtail the PRP. 3 Ultimately, the IRS concluded that revision
was necessary to salvage it.
Even after reworking parts of the PRP, the IRS gained few new sup-
porters with its Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure (RPRP) issued early in
1979. 4 As had the PRP, the RPRP generated heavy opposition within the
private and religious school movement. In addition, the RPRP was attacked by
some supporters of the PRP who considered the new procedures ineffective and
inadequate. 5 Still, as the Congressional Subcommittee Hearings on the RPRP
(the Hearings) 6 indicate, supporters of religious private schools provide the
main opposition to the RPRP. As a group, this is a formidable opponent. In
1976 nearly ten percent, or approximately 5,000,000, of the children enrolled
in elementary and secondary schools in America attended nonpublic schools.7
Attendance in church-related private schools accounted for eighty-six percent
of that total,8 and witnesses at the Hearings noted that new Christian schools
are opening in the United States at the rate of two or three every day. 9
The phenomenal growth rate of private religious schools, despite the
financial sacrifice a separate school system requires, is attributable to many
factors: the exclusion of prayer and Bible reading from the public school
system;10 a growing perception among parents and pastors that public schools
1 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). A detailed overview of this originally proposed revenue procedure can
be found in Wilson, Internal Revenue Service's Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Schools as Tax-Exempt Organiza-
tions, 15 GA. ST. B.J. 110 (1979).
2 Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]
(statement of Robert J. Billings on behalf of Christian Schools).
3 For a discussion of the bills introduced in the Ninety-Sixth Congress on this matter see Anderson,
Tax Exempt Private Schools Which Discriminate on the Basis of Race: A Proposed Revenue Procedure, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 356, 374-377 (1980).
4 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979). A comparison of the Proposed Revenue Procedure and the Revised Pro-
posed Revenue Procedure is found in Anderson, supra note 3, at 356-358.
5 See, e.g., note 106 infra.
6 See note 2 supra.
7 Rice, Conscientious Objection to Public Education: The Grievance and the Remedies, B.Y.U. L. REv. 847, 847
(1978).
8 Id.
9 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1041 (statement of Louis Wilson Ingram,Jr., Chief Counsel of the Founda-
tion of Law and Society, on behalf of 23 private Christian schools). See also Rice, supra note 7, at 847 n.3.
10 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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are not "areligious and authentically neutral," but "centers for the promotion
of a competing faith" usually referred to as secular humanism;I dissatisfaction
with the educational quality of the public school system; 12 concern about in-
creasing public school problems with discipline, drugs, and violence;' 3 and in
some instances, a desire to evade the desegregation of the public schools.14
The use of private schools to escape public school desegregation is what
the IRS is taking aim at in the RPRP.'5 Supporters of private education
generally and Christian education particularly are aware of the accusation that
"[e]very school that's been started to evade desegregation has called itself
Christian."1 6 But considering the widespread and intense alarm at the RPRP
in the religious community to be a pretext for racial discrimination ignores the
real question at issue.' 7 Opposition to the RPRP by religious schools does not
stem from discriminatory motives but from two basic concerns. First of all,
religious schools fear the method the RPRP proposes for fighting racial
discrimination in private schools. 18 Secondly, religious schools fear that
government will increasingly intrude into religious schools in the future if the
RPRP is allowed to take effect.' 9
The fervor of the opposition will not cause the IRS to abandon the princi-
ple of the RPRP. The IRS contends that the courts have given it no choice but
to promulgate procedures such as the RPRP. 20 No resolution of this conflict is
possible, however, without focusing on the problems the RPRP raises under
the first amendment religion clauses.
II. The RPRP
The RPRP sets forth guidelines the IRS will apply in determining
whether private elementary and secondary schools have racially discriminatory
admissions policies and are therefore not qualified for tax exemption under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 21 The RPRP focuses on two
11 Rice, supra note 7, at 848. The Rice article provides an excellent discussion of this concern and
evaluates the remedies available to those who object to what they consider to be an unconstitutional religion
of secular humanism in the public schools.
12 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 931 (legal brief prepared for the Georgia Association of Christian
Schools, Inc. by Wendell R. Bird).
13 Id.
14 The term "white flight" is commonly used to describe an influx of students into private schools when
the motivation is avoiding desegregation in the public schools.
15 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,452 (1979) (proposed § 1.01).
16 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1244-45 (Clarence Mitchell, former Washington lobbyist for the NAACP,
quoted in "IRS Plan to Penalize Schools That Discriminate Denounced," Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1978).
17 This is evident from the opposition to the RPRP among religious schools not directly or immediately
affected by it. Representatives of integrated religious schools appeared at the Hearings to object to the
RPRP. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 497, 510, 548, 571. In addition, religious schools which would ap-
parently be exempted from the penalties of the RPRP for other reasons also opposed the IRS's plans. See,
e.g., id. at 280 (Amish), 497 (Catholic), 510 (Lutheran), 909 (Jewish).
It is significant too that Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, where the IRS took the position that
religious schools with discriminatory admissions policies were not tax exempt, spawned no such opposition.
The vast majority of those objecting to the RPRP are not in disagreement with that basic idea but are ab-
solutely opposed to the RPRP's manner of effectuating it.
18 See notes 102-133 infra and accompanying text.
19 See notes 149-162 infra and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 3-8 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue).
21 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,452 (1979) (proposed § 1.01).
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categories of schools; those "adjudicated to be discriminatory, ' 22 and those
which are determined to be "reviewable."23
The first type of school affected by the RPRP is one found to be racially
discriminatory by a final decision of a federal or state court or administrative
agency. 24 A school adjudicated to be discriminatory will have its tax exemption
revoked 25 unless the IRS determines that the school currently has a "signifi-
cant minority enrollment" 26 or "has undertaken actions or programs
reasonably designed to attract minority students on a continuing basis." 27 This
category has not been controversial.
The RPRP category of schools which are "reviewable" 28 has received the
most criticism. The RPRP defines a reviewable school as one which meets
three criteria: (1) the school must have been "formed or substantially expand-
ed at the time of public school desegregation in the community served by the
school"; 29 (2) it must be one "which does not have significant minority enroll-
ment"; 30 and (3) its creation or substantial expansion must be "related in fact
to public school desegregation in the community.''3 1 Although the RPRP
states that all three'criteria must be met for a school to be considered
reviewable, 32 a school's formation or expansion at the time of public school
desegregation creates a presumption that the public school desegregation was
the reason for the private school's formation or expansion. According to the
RPRP, "[o]rdinarily, the formation or substantial expansion of a school at the
time of public school desegregation in the community will be considered to be
related in fact to public school desegregation." 33 The IRS will consider objec-
tive evidence, however, that the school's formation or expansion was not in fact
related to public school desegregation. 3 Once determined to be reviewable, a
22 Id. (proposed 5 3.02).
23 Id. at 9,452-53 (proposed 5 3.03).
24 Id. at 9,452 (proposed S 3.02).
25 Id. at 9,454 (proposed § 5.01). Since religious schools as a rule can show only a negligible profit at
best, the real sting of the RPRP comes from the resulting disallowance of contributions as tax-deductible
gifts (proposed § 5.03) and the chilling effect that has on the charitable contributions these schools need to
survive.
26 Id. (proposed 5 4.01(a)). Proposed 5 3.03(b) says that whether the minority enrollment is significant
"depends on all the relevant facts and circumstances" but that
[I]n any event, a school will be considered to have significant minority student enrollment if its
percentage of minority students is 20 percent or more of the percentage of the minority school age
population in the community served by the school. For example, if 50 percent of the school age
population in the community is minority, and the school enrolls 200 students, a school would not
be "reviewable" if it had at least 20 minority students.
Id. at 9,453.
27 Id. at 9,454 (proposed § 4.01(b)). Six examples of these programs are provided in proposed 5 4.03:
(1) active and vigorous minority recruitment programs; (2) publicized financial assistance for minority
students; (3) employment of, or substantial efforts to recruit, minority teachers; (4) participation with in-
tegrated schools in extracurricular activities; (5) special minority-oriented curriculum; (6) minority board
members. Id.
28 Id. at 9,453 (proposed § 3.03).
29 Id. The period covered is from one year before implementation of a public school desegregation plan
in the community to three years after substantial implementation of such a plan. Id. (proposed 5 3.03(a)).
Substantial expansion is more than 20% per year. Id.
30 Id. (proposed 5 3.03). See note 26 supra for details regarding what constitutes a "significant" minori-
ty enrollment.
31 Id. (proposed § 3.03).
32 Id.
33 Id. (proposed S 3.03(c)).
34 Id. Proposed 5 3.03(c) lists seven factors indicating it was not related and seven indicating it was.
Factors indicating no relation are: (1) students are not to a significant extent drawn from public school
grades subject to expansion; (2) rate of expansion is not more than that in public schools; (3) expansion is
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school may still be considered racially nondiscriminatory, and thus keep or
regain its exemption, if it adopts affirmative action admissions programs like
those required of schools adjudicated to be discriminatory.3 5
Appeals of proposed exemption revocations can be made to the IRS Na-
tional Office36 or to the courts through a declaratory judgment procedure. 37
III. Religious Schools and the First Amendment
A. Religious Schools-A Constitutionally Sensitive Religious Liberty Interest
The Supreme Court has observed that education "ranks at the very apex"
of governmental interests, 38 but that parents have the right "to direct the up-
bringing and education of [their] children." 39 Nonetheless, the Court has con-
sistently refused to allow states to assist nonpublic schools with direct aid. 40
The Court views aid to religious schools, like aid to religions, as violative of the
Constitution's establishment clause.4 1 Rejecting the notion that the only dif-
ference between religious schools and public schools is an added course in
religion, the Court has maintained that "the secular education those schools
provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for
the school's existence. Within the institution, the two are inextricably inter-
twined. "42
Two modern Supreme Court decisions reveal the Court's sensitivity to the
difference between religious schools and public schools. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,43
the Court held that state support of salaries of teachers in religiot qv.hools was
unconstitutional. The holding was based on the Court's belief that "state
surveillance of religious schools in supervising this aid would involve excessive
and enduring entanglement between state and church." '44 The Catholic
parochial schools involved in Lemon were termed "an integral part of the
due to increase in school age population in the community; (4) expansion results from merger with another
school; (5) expansion follows pattern of adding grade levels as students in the lower grades advance; (6) for-
mat or expansion is in accordance with a long-standing practice of a religion not itself racially discriminatory
to provide schools when circumstances make it possible; (7) at the time of formation or expansion, the school
had some minority students, faculty, or board members.
Factors indicating relation to desegregation are: (1) opening or expansion of grades subject to public
school desegregation; (2) students enrolled are primarily drawn from public schools; (3) the school uses
former public school facilities available because of the implementation of public school desegregation; (4) the
school is a member of an organization practicing or advocating racial segregation in schools; (5) the school,
its founders, officers, substantial contributors, or trustees have opposed public school desegregation; (6) the
school limits enrollment to an area with few or no minorities, and this limitation coincides with a desegrega-
tion plan to exchange these students with those in an area with substantial minority population; (7) non-
minority faculty added at formation or expansion are primarily from the public school system being
desegregated.
35 Id. at 9,454 (proposed § 4.02). See note 27 supra for a listing of the kinds of things included in this re-
quirement.
36 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,454-55 (1979) (proposed § 7).
37 The RPRP does not specify this, but it does not limit this right which is available under I.R.C. over
§ 7428.
38 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
39 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
40 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
41 See, e.g., the cases cited in note 40 supra.
42 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 250 (quoting Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975)).
43 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
44 Id. at 619.
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religious mission of the Catholic Church,'' 45 involving "substantial religious
activity and purpose.'"46 In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas remarked
"how remote this type of school is from the secular school .... Those who man
these schools are good people, zealous people, dedicated people. But they are
dedicated to ideas that the Framers of our Constitution placed beyond the
reach of govenment."47
In National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago48 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle that governmental intrusion into religious
schools differs from government regulation of other private educational institu-
tions. In holding that the NLRB could not assert jurisdiction over Catholic
schools, the Court reemphasized "the admitted and obvious fact that the raison
d'etre of parochial schools is the propagation of a religious faith." 49 The Court
saw "no escape from conflicts flowing from the Board's exercise ofjurisdiction
over teachers in church-operated schools and the consequent serious First
Amendment questions that would follow." 50 So sensitive is this area, said the
Court, that a statute should not be construed to allow government intervention
in religious schools "absent affirmative intention of the Congress clearly ex-
pressed." ,51 Thus, the foundation of any procedure which involves the govern-
ment in religious schools must be a heightened awareness that involvement
with first amendment religious liberty issues is unavoidable.
B. The First Amendment Religion Clauses
The Constitution's mandates regarding religion are clearly stated in two
clauses in the first amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. "52 The
Supreme Court has found, however, that the interpretation and enforcement of
these clauses has necessitated walking a "tightrope." 53 Both clauses "are cast
in absolute terms, and either .... if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend
to clash with the other." '54 Although the two clauses expressly proscribe
''governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion," '5 5 in the vast grey area between the extreme cases where these prin-
ciples produce easy answers, "there is room for play in the joints productive of
a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.' '56
1. The Establishment Clause
According to the Supreme Court, "The 'establishment of religion' clause
45 Id. at 609.
46 Id. at 616.
47 Id. at 640 (Douglas, J., concurring).
48 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
49 Id. at 503 (quoting Douglas, J., in 403 U.S. at 628).
50 440 U.S. at 503.
51 Id. at 506.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 1, 2.
53 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
54 Id. at 668-69.
55 Id. at 669.
56 Id.
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of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." 57 The Supreme Court
has developed three criteria to test governmental enactments against the
demands of the establishment clause: (1) the enactments must have a secular
purpose; (2) their principal effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion,
and (3) they must not foster excessive government entanglement with.
religion. 58 Although the first two criteria are relatively unambiguous, the con-
cept of excessive entanglement warrants discussion.
The degree of entanglement between government and religion has been a
standard first amendment inquiry only since Walz v. Tax Commission59 in 1970.
The Supreme Court in Walz reviewed the validity of property tax exemptions
for religious organizations. Confronted with the argument that tax exemptions,
like general subsidies, constitute impermissible government sponsorship of
religious activity, the Court decided that exemptions and subsidies provide
economic assistance in fundamentally different ways.
A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the subsidized enter-
prise and uses resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on
the other hand, involves no such transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise
only passively, by relieving a privately funded venture of the burden of paying
taxes.
60
The exemption is therefore a significant "manifestation that organized religion
is not expected to support the state."61 The Court found that the entanglement
created by eliminating the exemption and taxing the property of religious
organizations would exceed the entanglement involved in retaining the exemp-
tion. The Court therefore refused to strike down the exemption as unconstitu-
tional. 62
Since Walz, the entanglement issue has typically arisen in cases involving
govenment aid to religion. In Lemon v. Kurtzman63 and Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 64 direct state subsidies to church-related schools were in-
volved. In both cases the Court found that the government had moved so far
into religion that the entanglement was excessive.
As pointed out in Walz, what constitutes excessive government entangle-
ment with religion "is inescapably [a question] of degree." 65 In Lemon "a com-
prehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" 66 was held ex-
cessive because of "the danger that pervasive modern governmental power will
57 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
58 433 U.S. at 236.
59 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
60 Id. at 690.
61 Id.
62 Walz held that tax exemptions were not prohibited by the first amendment, not that they were required
by it. Although the decision's language strongly suggests that a tax exemption for churches is required by
the first amendment, there is no Supreme Court case directly addressing that issue.
63 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
64 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
65 397 U.S. at 674.
66 403 U.S. at 619.
[October 19801
[Vol. 56:141]
ultimately intrude on religion and thus conflict with the Religion Clauses." 67
In contrast, on the same day the Court upheld federal construction grants to
sectarian colleges in Tilton v. Richardson.6 8 The Court characterized the
surveillance necessary to make sure the buildings constructed were used for
secular purposes as a "minimal contact ' 69 not involving excessive entangle-
ment.
Because the entanglement issue has arisen almost exclusively in govern-
mental aid programs, some RPRP supporters have argued that entanglement
objections to the RPRP are irrelevant since the RPRP is not a program of aid
to religion. 70 The Supreme Court's language on entanglement suggests other-
wise, however. In Walz the Court refused to deny churches the passive aid of
tax exemption because the "[e]limination of exemption would tend to expand
the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church prop-
erty, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that
follow in the train of these legal processes." 7 1 The Court also observed that the
obvious problem with direct grants is that they "could encompass sustained
and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory and ad-
ministrative standards. 72 In Lemon the Court said the objective of entanglement
analysis is "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [government
or religious institutions] into the precincts of the other." ' 73 Concurring in
Lemon, Justice Douglas stated that excessive entanglement may arise through
the "intrusion of the government into religious schools through grants, super-
vision, or surveillance.' '74
The Court in Lemon concluded that "state inspection and evaluation of the
religious content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of entangle-
ment that the Constitution forbids." 75 National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago76 is a more recent indication that any government regulation of
religion can raise the entanglement issue. The Court did not reach the constitu-
tional issue 77 but left little doubt that the threat of an entangling church-state
relationship was the key consideration in this case. NLRB involvement in the
religious schools would
necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the
clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school's religious mission. It is
not only the conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge
on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but the very process of inquiry
leading to findings and.conclusions. 78
67 Id.
68 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
69 Id. at 688.
70 SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, STAFF REPORT ON IRS's PROCEDURE REGARDING THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF PRIVATE
SCHOOLS, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
71 397 U.S. at 674.
72 Id.
73 403 U.S. at 615.
74 Id. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 620.
76 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
77 The Court found that the National Labor Relations Act did not give the NLRB jurisdiction over
church-related schools. Id. at 507.
78 Id. at 502.
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The Supreme Court thus considers the entanglement inquiry relevant to situa-
tions other than those involving direct government aid to religious groups.
2. The Free Exercise Clause
The Supreme Court has found it necessary to elaborate upon the ap-
parently absolute mandate of the free exercise clause which says that "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." 7 9
Freedom of belief, the Court has decided, is an absolute freedom guaranteed
by the constitution. The government may not interfere with or try to regulate
any citizen's religious beliefs, or coerce him to affirm beliefs repugnant to him,
or directly penalize or discriminate against him for holding beliefs with which
others disagree. 80 Under the free exercise clause, the government is "deprived
of all legislative power over mere opinion."'81
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has distinguished the government's in-
ability to control belief from its right to control action based on belief. This
distinction was first articulated in a series of cases which upheld the govern-
ment's right to prohibit Mormons from practicing polygamy. 82 Some cases
have made the belief-action distinction appear nearly dispositive. For example,
in Berea College v. Kentucky83 a state statute prohibiting schools from educating
blacks and whites in the same building was challenged by a Christian school
which claimed this racial distinction violated its right of free religious exercise.
The Supreme Court upheld the statute on the theory the state could prohibit
action based on religious belief even though it could not control religious belief
itself.
Free exercise analysis rests on more than a belief-action dichotomy,
however. In Sherbert v. Verner84 a Seventh Day Adventist sought unemployment
compensation while refusing to take ajob which required her to work on Satur-
day, her Sabbath. The Supreme Court found that "condition[ing] the
availability of [unemployment] benefits upon this appellant's willingness to
violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalize[d] ' 85 her
free exercise of religion. With the free exercise of religion, "[o]nly the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limita-
tion. ''86
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 87 the Supreme Court upheld the free exercise claim
of Amish parents who refused to send their children to school beyond the eighth
grade in violation of a Wisconsin statute requiring students to attend school un-
til age sixteen. The Court concluded that "only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
79 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
80 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
81 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
82 Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beacon, 133 U.S. 333 (1890);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
83 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
84 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
85 Id. at 406.
86 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
87 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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free exercise of religion. "8 This is a much more complex analysis than a mere
belief-action distinction.
IV. First Amendment Problems with the RPRP
A. Impermissibly Favoring Some Religions Over Others
The establishment clause clearly prohibits the government's preferring
one religion over another. In Walz, the Supreme Court stated: "Few concepts
are more deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life . . . than for the
government to exercise at the very least [a] benevolent neutrality toward
churches and religious exercise generally, so long as none was favored over
others and none suffered interference." ' 89 The RPRP runs afoul of that first
amendment proscription in three ways: (1) the RPRP favors religions which
have a long-standing practice of establishing schools; (2) it favors religions
which use a hierarchical rather than a congregational form of organization; and
(3) it establishes a precedent which favors religions that adhere to federal public
policy.
1. A Tradition of Establishing Schools
The RPRP establishes a general principle that the formation or substan-
tial expansion of a private school at the time of public school desegregation will
be presumed to be related in fact to desegregation. 90 A school formed or
substantially expanded at the time of public school desegregation is therefore
almost automatically reviewable. One factor which the IRS will consider as
rebutting this presumption, however, is whether "the school was formed.., in
accordance with a long-standing practice of a religion... to provide schools for
religious education. . ... ,91 This exception is generally understood to cover
Catholic schools, Lutheran schools, and similar established religious school
programs. 92 Schools formed by denominations with a history of religious
education will thus more easily escape being classified as reviewable. Such a
provision constitutes a governmental preference of older, established religions
with a practice of organizing schools, to the detriment of recently formed
denominations or denominations only recently entering the field of private
education. 93
2. Commonly Supervised Schools
The RPRP also unconstitutionally prefers some religions over others in its
88 Id. at 215.
89 397 U.S. at 676.
90 See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text. This presumption of segregative intent drew a great
deal of criticism at the Hearings on the RPRP. This criticism seems justified since such a presumption ac-
cords undue, and conceivably nearly conclusive, weight to the first two factors which make a school
reviewable, i.e., time of formation and level of minority enrollment.
91 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (1979) (proposed 5 3.03 (c)(6)).
92 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 285, 388, 488, 557-58, 1047-48.
93 Many critics of the RPRP saw it as taking aim at the many recently formed Fundamentalist Chris-
tian Schools. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 285, 388, 557-58, 1047-48. The kind of "headaches" for the
government which these schools can cause with their adamant refusal to tolerate more than minimal govern-
mental interference is exemplified in Ohio v. Whisner, 47 Ohio 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
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treatment of religious schools which are "part of a system of commonly super-
vised schools. 94 One of the three factors in designating a school as reviewable
is a determination of whether or not the school has a significant minority
enrollment.95 The RPRP permits individual schools not having significant
minority enrollments to meet this standard, however, if they are part of a
school system with a significant minority enrollment.9 6 The preference in-
herent in this provision stems from a basic difference in the way denominations
organize their church governments. For example, Baptist churches and other
independent churches have a congregational form of church government.
Because autonomy is mandated by their congregational form of govenment,
these churches simply do not organize their schools into school systems.9 7 In
contrast, other religions or denominations, such as the Catholic Church, have
hierarchical church organizations and frequently establish systems of common-
ly supervised schools. Schools run by churches which are hierarchically
organized can thus take advantage of a latitude in the RPRP denied to schools
run by churches which are organized congregationally. Making tax exempt
status more easily available to religious schools run by churches with hierar-
chical organizations contravenes the establishment clause's proscription
against governmental preference of some religions over others.
3. Public Policy
The RPRP is also objectionable because it is a dangerous step toward
governmental preference of religions which embrace public policy over those
which refuse to do so. The IRS takes the position that any § 501(c)(3) 98
charitable organization which violates public policy should be denied tax ex-
empt status.9 9 Once one concedes that religious organizations must agree with
94 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (1979) (proposed § 3.03 (b)).
95 See note 26 supra.
96 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (1979) (proposed § 3.03 (b)). This provision would not apply if the system
were gerrymandered so as to be, in effect, a dual school system. Id.
97 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 283, 540-41.
98 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) enumerates the following exempt purposes: "religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational."
99 The IRS has published its explanation for such a conclusion in Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
According to the IRS, the listing of exempt purposes in 501(c)(3) (see note 98 supra) affords exemptions only
to those organizations which were charitable at common law. Since a charity at common law could not be il-
legal or contrary to public policy, any 501(c)(3) organizations, such as religious schools, which violate
public policy should, in the IRS's view, be subject to taxation.
Not only the language of § 501(c)(3) itself contradicts any interpretation of the listed exempt purposes
as mere examples of "charitable," the regulations are even clearer:
(d) Exempt Purposes-(1) In general. (i) An organization may be exempt as an organization
described in section 501(c)(3) if it is organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the
following purposes:
(a) Religious,
(b) Charitable,
(c) Scientific,
(d) Testing for Public Safety,
(e) Educational, or
(f) Prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
(iii) Since each of these purposes specified in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph is an exempt purpose in
itself, an organization may be exempt if it is organized and operated exclusively for any one or
more of such purposes.
26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(I), (2) (emphasis added).
For a more thorough criticism of the IRS's reasoning, see Note, The Internal Revenue Service's Treatment of
Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimination by Tax Exempt Organizations, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925, 929-31
(1979).
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public policy in order to remain tax exempt, those religious organizations
whose policies are not coordinated with public policy are inhibited and those in
tune with public policy are advanced. The RPRP's greatest threat is that "[i]f
this nation ever comes to the place that federal policy must in all cases take
precedence to religious freedoms, then religious freedoms are a thing of the
past.''100
Public policy does not adequately safeguard the first amendment religious
guarantees. 10 1 The public policy on racial discrimination has shifted
dramatically in a generation. A public policy against discrimination on the
basis of sex has taken shape only recently. A public policy against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation has achieved a focus in little more than a
decade. The first question is whether the government should try to force
religious organizations to adopt any public policies. If there are public policies
which the government should impose upon religious organizations, the difficul-
ty becomes deciding which policies to enforce. If only religious schools adher-
ing to public policy are allowed to retain their tax-exempt status, the establish-
ment clause protection against governmental preference of some religions over
others will be undermined.
B. Entanglement
In National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Supreme
Court declared that "good intentions by government-or third parties" do not
override the constitutional prohibition against excessive government entangle-
ment in church-related schools.' 0 2 Therefore, even if the RPRP has been
motivated by the best intentions, that does not sidestep the constitutional prob-
lem. The inquiry must still focus on the "danger' ' 0 3 or the "significant
risk' 1 0 4 of excessive entanglement.
The RPRP states at the outset that, "[t]he question whether a private
school has a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is based on all the
applicable facts and circumstances."105 Even some supporters of IRS action to
eliminate discrimination in private schools criticize the RPRP as "subjective
decision making.' 1° 6 The necessity of the IRS agent's subjective judgment is
100 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1129 (statement of Robert Baldwin on behalf of Citizens for Educational
Freedom).
101 A chief reason religious schools fear being subjected to the dictates of public policy is illustrated in
some matter-of-fact language in Green v. Conally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (1971), one of the main cases used to
support the RPRP. The Court in Green stated:
Changes in the courts' conceptions of what is charitable are wrought by changes in moral
and ethical precepts generally held, or by changes in relative values assigned to different and
sometimes competing and even conflicting interests of society.
Scholarly authorities agree that the standards may change over time so that enumerated
categories may not be immutably "charitable." Professor Bogert writes:
The courts should be left free to apply the standards of the time. What is charitable in
one generation may be non-charitable in a later age, and vice versa. Ideas regarding social
benefit and public good change from century to century, and vary in different communities.
Id. at 1159 (footnotes omitted).
102 440 U.S. at 502.
103 403 U.S. at 620.
104 440 U.S. at 502.
105 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,452 (1979) (proposed § 3.03).
106 Hearings, supra note 2, at 462 (statement of Bill Lann Lee, assistant counsel, NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc.). See also Hearings, supra note 2, at 1066 (statement of New York representative
Shirley Chisholm).
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evident throughout the RPRP. For example, although the RPRP begins with
an objective percentage test to determine if a school's minority enrollment is
significant, 10 7 the RPRP follows this objective test with a subjective one. For a
school with a minority enrollment less than twenty percent of the minority
population in the community, the IRS will evaluate the curriculum and special
programs to determine whether they legitimately limit the school's appeal to
minorities or are intended to exclude minorities. 108 In addition, the IRS will
consider any other "relevant facts and circumstances"10 9 bearing on the ques-
tion of whether a school's minority enrollment is significant. Also, some, but
not all, schools with insignificant minority enrollments will be allowed to
escape the reviewable classification because they are part of school systems
which, as a whole, have a significant percentage of minority students. The IRS
plans to base its determination of which of these schools will be reviewable on
an evaluation of the reasons for the school system being organized and
operated as it is.10
The RPRP's rebuttable presumption that a school formed or substantially
expanded at a time of public school desegregation is discriminatory will also
create excessive entanglement. In its decision of whether or not this presump-
tion should apply to a particular school, the IRS promises to "tak[e] into ac-
count all the facts and circumstances relating to the school's formation or ex-
pansion.""' One inquiry centers on whether students come from other private
schools, from public schools not undergoing desegregation, or from public
schools being desegregated. "1 2 How many suspect transfers are too many is not
specified and is therefore left to the IRS to decide. The IRS will also determine
whether a denomination not itself discriminatory has a long-standing practice
of opening schools."t 3 Such a determination will necessarily involve an IRS in-
quiry into whether a religious denomination is discriminatory," 4 whether the
denomination has a "long-standing" practice of religious education, and
whether its reasons for organizing a particular school are sufficiently non-
discriminatory. The IRS will also investigate the organizations to which
religious schools belong to determine if these organizations practice or advocate
segregation." 5 The RPRP commits the IRS to exploring the backgrounds and
activities of the school's founders, officers, substantial contributors, and
trustees," 6 in an attempt to discover any efforts on their part to oppose public
school desegregation. The IRS will also scrutinize the community served by a
school to see if discrimination has helped establish the "community."" 7 Com-
pounding its subjectivity, the RPRP provides that its criteria for rebutting the
presumption of discrimination against schools formed or expanded at the time
of public school desegregation are simply illustrative, not exclusive." 8
107 See note 26 supra.
108 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (1979) (proposed S 3.03 (b)).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. (proposed § 3.03(c)).
112 Id. (proposed S 3.03(c)(1)).
113 Id. (proposed 9 3.03(c)(6)).
114 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 263 (testimony of IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz).
115 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,453 (1979) (proposed S 3.03(c)(1 1)).
116 Id. (proposed § 3.03(c)(12)).
117 Id. (proposed § 3.03(c)(13)).
118 Id. (proposed § 3.03(c)).
[October 19801
[Vol. 56:141]
The RPRP provides for still greater entanglement if religious schools ad-
judicated to be discriminatory or classified as reviewable nevertheless desire
tax-exempt status. In such circumstances the RPRP requires either a signifi-
cant minority enrollment 19 or "actions and programs reasonably designed to
attract minority students on a continuing basis."' 12 0 The IRS will determine
what actions and programs are reasonable with little guidance from the RPRP.
The RPRP simply provides that "the level of actions and programs that are
adequate may vary from school to school and depends on the circumstances of
the school.' '121 The actions and programs outlined by the RPRP as examples
of the types of actions and programs which are reasonable require IRS ap-
proval of nearly every aspect of a school's operation. These aspects include but
are not limited to: student recruitment; 122 school advertisements; 123 com-
munication to minority groups; 124 personal contacts with prospective minority
students; 1 25 school participation in local, regional, or national recruitment
plans; 126 financial assistance to minorities; 12 7 efforts to recruit minority staff
members; 128 extracurricular participation with integrated schools; 129 "special
minority-oriented curriculum or orientation programs' ";130 and racial composi-
tion of the school board.1 31 If these actions or programs by a private school do
not lead to a significant minority enrollment within a "reasonable" time, the
IRS has the prerogative to decide if these activities "are adequate or are under-
taken in good faith." ' 132
Even if one approves of such actions and programs, that would not justify
the IRS's injecting itself into nearly every aspect of a religious school's affairs.
Religious schools understandably find such government intervention, enforced
with the taxing power, frightening. The words of the Supreme Court in Lemon
are applicable to the RPRP: "[W]e cannot ignore here the danger that per-
vasive modern governmental power will ultimately intrude on religion and
thus conflict with the religion clauses.' ' 133
C. The Least Restrictive Alternative
Because a religious liberty interest is at stake, 134 both the direct and in-
direct 35 consequences of the RPRP must be carefully scrutinized. To justify
government regulation of religious interests, the government interest must be
of the highest order.1 36 Although the elimination of purposeful racial
119 Id. at 9,454 (proposed § 4.01(a)). See note 26 supra.
120 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,454 (1979) (proposed § 4.01(b)).
121 Id. (proposed 9 4.03).
122 Id. (proposed § 4.03(1)).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. (proposed § 4.03(2)).
128 Id. (proposed § 4.03(3)).
129 Id. (proposed § 4.03(4)).
130 Id. (proposed § 4.03(5)).
131 Id. (proposed 5 4.03(6)).
132 Id. (proposed § 4.03).
133 403 U.S. at 620.
134 See notes 38-51 supra and accompanying text.
135 374 U.S. at 403-04.
136 See notes 84-88 supra and accompanying text.
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discrimination is an interest of the highest order, finding such an interest does
not end the inquiry. In Sherbert v. Verner the Supreme Court said it "would
plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no alter-
native forms of regulation' ' t 37 would achieve the compelling government in-
terest. In examining what some of these alternatives might be, the fact that
they might be "less efficient and convenient" 38 is not sufficient to reject them.
IRS intrusion into religious schools cannot be sustained unless the RPRP is the
least restrictive alternative. 39
There are less restrictive alternatives which may be "less efficient and
convenient" but which do a better job of protecting the first amendment in-
terests of religious schools. Those testifying at the Hearings on the RPRP
disagreed on whether the present IRS policies are adequate. 140 To emphasize
the need for the RPRP, Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of the IRS, testified that
about twenty private schools adjudicated as discriminatory have been able to
keep their tax exemption. 141 The Hearing Subcommittee Staff Report,14 2
however, questions whether the present IRS Revenue Rule 143 requires the IRS
to allow these schools to keep their exemptions. Providing for more stringent
enforcement of the existing policy would certainly impinge less severely on the
religious liberty interests involved than would the RPRP. Another less restric-
tive alternative to the RPRP has already received scholarly treatment: 144 an ac-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.145 The Supreme Court has upheld a § 1981 at-
tack on racial discrimination in nonreligious private schools and reserved the
question of its application to religious schools. 146 The use of a § 1981 action to
attack discrimination in religious schools would avoid the RPRP's insensitivity
to religious liberty interests. 147
137 374 U.S. at 407.
138 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
139 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940).
140 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 968, 1299.
141 Id. at 253.
142 STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at 16-17.
143 Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
144 Note, supra note 99.
145 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exac-
tions of every kind, and to no other.
146 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
147 The author of the Note, supra note 99, concludes:
The factual setting of a § 1981 action would be more conducive to an equitable resolution of the
free exercise claim. Another advantage of relying on private 5 1981 suits to attack the racial
discrimination is that this approach creates a "presumption" in favor of the religious practice.
The organization would not be required to contest the tax assessment in order to receive a full air-
ing of its constitutional claim. The religious practice would be allowed unless an injured party
asserted a claim sufficient to outweigh the religious interest. The effect of this "presumption"
serves to promote an atmosphere of "benevolent neutrality." The tax benefit is certainly
"benevolent" and the across-the-board grant of the benefit is "neutral."
This approach also avoids the major problem of the IRS's solution-the failure to evaluate
adequately a fundamental constitutional claim. A 5 1981 suit is a much better factual vehicle for a
thorough assessment of the constitutional considerations. When the racially discriminatory prac-
tices have a serious impact, they will undoubtedly be attacked by the injured parties. Although
the government would not be taking affirmative steps to eradicate the possible abuses, its con-
scientious resolution of the claims would help to bring about an equitable accommodation of in-
terests. More importantly, this government policy would reflect an appropriate sensitivity to the
fundamental rights involved.
Id. at 950-51.
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In any event, the field of religious liberty is no place for ill-conceived and
imprudent action. Great caution is necessary. The Supreme Court has
recognized the potential for IRS abuse in its regulation of tax-exempt organiza-
tions and considers Congress "the appropriate body to weigh the relevant
policy-laden consideration" 148 involved in how tax-exempt organizations
should be treated. That would seem to be a wiser course in this delicate area as
well.
V. The Progression Argument
Testimony at the Hearings shows that much of the opposition to the
RPRP is based on a fear that the principle at work in the RPRP "is rapidly ex-
pandable. 149 Even schools not covered by the RPRP registered their concern
"that conceding this principle would lead to other objectionable situations." 1 5 0
In promulgating the RPRP the IRS maintains that religious freedoms do
not include illegal acts such as racial discrimination. 151 Religious school sup-
porters see a principle inimical to religious liberty at work if methods like the
RPRP are used to attack discrimination.
Racial discrimination is not the only type of discrimination which the
United States government has been seeking to eliminate. There are similar na-
tional policies against discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, and sexual
orientation. That these and other public policies could also be applied against
religious organizations by threatening loss of tax exemptions or some other
government sanction is not a baseless fear. The former Department of Health,
Education and Welfare threatened to sue Brigham Young University "to pre-
vent the separation of single men and women in sexually segregated housing off
campus,"1 52 despite the Mormon's religious basis for this practice. Other
religions and denominations make distinctions based on sex which they believe
are biblically mandated. No doubt, under government standards these distinc-
tions would be unacceptable. Pressure to extend the principle of the RPRP to
cover sex discrimination already exists. For example, an assistant staff director
for federal evaluations of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights stated: "We
also believe that IRS should specifically prohibit racial, ethnic, and sex
discrimination in the treatment and selection of faculty.' '153 The remarks of
Professor Bernard Wolfman, a pro-RPRP witness at the Hearings and an ex-
pert on federal tax law, indicate that there is even pressure on the IRS to
eliminate religious discrimination in private schools.1 5 4 Expressing his opinion
on whether a private school discriminating on the basis of religion or creed
should be tax exempt, Professor Wolfman said:
148 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749-50 (1974).
149 Hearings, supra note 2, at 303 (statement of William B. Ball, the attorney who defended the Amish in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). The Court in Walz referred to this argument as the "foot in the
door" or the "nose of the camel in the tent." 397 U.S. at 678.
150 Hearings, supra note 2, at 506 (statement of Martin V. Cowan, Secretary of National Jewish Commis-
sion on Law and Public Affairs).
151 STAFF REPORT, supra note 70, at 5.
152 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 1299 (statement of New Jersey Representative Matthew J. Rinaldo).
153 Hearings, supra note 2, at 298 (emphasis added).
154 Hearings, supra note 2, at 275.
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I would think that tax exemption should be denied in those circumstances
unless it can be demonstrated-and I don't know of a case in which it can be
demonstrated-that the association of the religious children, the children
which share the religion within the institution, that that association would ut-
terly defeat the ability of the school to maintain its curriculum or these
students to maintain their equilibrium.1 55
The principle inherent in the RPRP might also lead to a clash between the
government and religious organizations over discrimination against homosex-
uals. The Bible condemns homosexual behavior,15 6 and many churches accept
that literally. On the other hand, a federal public policy against discrimination
based on sexual orientation is taking shape. There is evidence that religious
groups are justified in fearing retaliation for opposing such a government
policy. A lawsuit has recently been brought against an Orthodox Presbyterian
Church in California because it fired its homosexual organist. 157 Although the
church's position was upheld at the trial level, such an attempt to enforce this
public policy shows that the concerns of religious organizations are not
groundless.
The RPRP is not the type of setting in which the Supreme Court has
found unpersuasive an argument based on the "tendency of a principle to ex-
pand itself to the limit of its logic." 51 8 The Court rejected the progression argu-
ment in Walz because the argument against tax exemptions for churches as the
first step in a progression to the establishment of religion was undercut by
history. Over 200 years of granting such exemptions without that happening
made it safe to assume that that fear would not be realized.1
59
On the other hand, in Lemon the Court found the progression argument to
be highly persuasive. State aid to religious schools had no long history which
indicated that these fears were groundless. Instead, the Court considered the
threatened increasing involvement of government in religious schools "a warn-
ing signal": 16
0
We have already noted that modern governmental programs have self-
perpetuating and self-expanding propensities .... Nor can we fail to see that
in constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought to
approach "the verge," have become the platform for yet further steps. A cer-
tain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a "downhill
thrust" easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop. Development by
momentum is not invariably bad; indeed it is the way the common law has
grown, but it is a force to be recognized and reckoned with. The dangers are
increased by the difficulty of perceiving in advance exactly where the "verge"
of the precipice lies. 161
The RPRP is not grounded upon an understanding of "the magnitude of
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., Romans 1:24-28; I Corinthians 6:9.
157 See Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church, No. 778930 (Cal., San Francisco Mun. Ct., filed
May 14, 1979).
158 374 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting B. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 51 (1921)).
159 374 U.S. at 675-80.
160 403 U.S. at 625.
161 Id. at 624.
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the evil comprised in the precedent.' '162 To protect the religious liberty in-
terests with which the RPRP deals, such an understanding is essential.
VI. Who Decides?
Sensitive, difficult, far-reaching decisions are involved in the confronta-
tion between the IRS and religious schools. A crucial question is who will make
the decisions needed to balance federal policy and first amendment guarantees.
Walking the first amendment "tightrope"1 63 is a formidable task. After almost
two centuries of trying to resolve questions involving the first amendment
religion guarantees and issues of discrimination, even the most brilliant legal
minds have been unable to lay these questions to rest.
IRS agents are simply not qualified to make the sensitive and difficult
decisions required of them by the RPRP. The training and practical experience
of IRS agents hardly makes them experts in matters of civil rights and religious
liberty. IRS Commissioner Kurtz has himself expressed doubts about the
IRS's abilities in this area:
Of all the interpretative judgments the Internal Revenue Service must make
in administering the tax laws, probably none is more difficult and none
demands more sensitivity than those concerning tax consequences affected by
questions of religion and civil rights. These questions are far afield from the
more typical tasks of tax administrators-determining taxable income. 164
Before becoming IRS Commissioner, Mr. Kurtz noted that "it is becoming in-
creasingly clear ... that while there are some things the tax system can do ex-
tremely well and efficiently, it can do only poorly and inefficiently most of the
tasks that are being proposed for it. '"165 Mr. Kurtz suggested that one should
assume that "the basic purpose of the tax system is to raise revenue in a way
which is consistent with general economic growth and prosperity-rather than
assuming that it is a system designed to cure social problems."1 66
Responding to the observation that the RPRP puts great responsibility on
the IRS agent in the field, Mr. Kurtz foresaw no particular problems in ad-
ministering the RPRP. He noted the possibility of appeal and commented:
"Yes, it is the revenue agent's responsibility initially, but they shoulder
responsibility all the time.' 1 67 The suggestion that the questions involved in
administering the RPRP are simply "all in a day's work" glosses over the
perplexities involved and contradicts Mr. Kurtz's earlier testimony at the
Hearings. When asked whether a school which limited its enrollment to
members of a particular religion would be exempted from the reach of the
RPRP, Mr. Kurtz replied, "Not necessarily.' ' 68 When asked why not, he
responded:
162 Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda, " 3 Wm. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 534, 555 (1946).
163 397 U.S. at 672.
164 Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems in Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 CATH. LAW. 301, 301
(1978).
165 Kurtz, Tax Incentives: Their Use and Misuse, U.S.C. LAW CENTER TAX INSTITUTE 1, 4 (1968).
166 Id. at 16.
167 Hearings, supra note 2, at 894.
168 Hearings, supra note 2, at 263.
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
I will tell you what the problem is. No. 1: I confess that I do not know quite
how to define a religion .... There are a number of extremely difficult defini-
tion problems that arise in trying to define a religion or a religious denomina-
tion.
I must say I find the task not very attractive in trying to determine
whether a religious denomination is discriminatory. ... 169
At the Hearings critics of the RPRP often focused on the danger of per-
mitting the IRS to become the decisionmaker in the sensitive area of religious
freedom. Senator Hatch of Utah, for example, noted that the RPRP
gives the IRS broad, sweeping, and open-ended discretion in evaluating the
evidence a private or religious school may submit in its own "defense." Such
blank checks go beyond the expertise and authority of the Internal Revenue
Service. The IRS' competence lies in the area of taxation and the collection of
revenues, not in the admission, recruitment, and employment policies of
private and religious schools and this fact is nowhere better demonstrated than
in the proposed regulation.
[ . . T]here are several instances in these regulations where the IRS
agent becomes the only judge of evidence presented by these private schools, a
"judge" bound by no real guidelines or accountability to the public. And it is
up to the IRS employee to determine, in his own subjective opinion, what is to
be considered reasonable and substantial in regard to items a reviewable
school might submit in its own behalf before such an inquisition. 170
One commentator has observed that the careful approach to decisions in-
volving religious schools mandated by the Supreme Court "stands in sharp
contrast to the IRS's treatment of the free exercise claim in Revenue Ruling
75-231,'' 17 1 which states the IRS's theory in revoking the tax exemptions of
organizations practicing religiously mbtivated discrimination. This commen-
tator has noted "the IRS's assessment of the religious interest clearly lacks the
requisite degree of thoroughness, ' 172 is a "simplistic inquiry, ' 173 and "is not
capable of satisfactorily discharging the constitutional obligations"' 174 involved
in the first amendment area.
VII. Conclusion
The controversy surrounding the RPRP stems from a clash of fundamen-
tal rights: freedom from racial discrimination in education and freedom of
religion. It would be a significant loss if the promise of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion175 were never fully achieved. The intractability of discrimination, however,
169 Id.
170 Id. at 726.
171 Note, supra note 99, at 943.
172 Id. at 944.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 374 U.S. 483 (1953).
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must not blind us to the flaws in the methods proposed to eradicate it. Before
the RPRP or a similar approach is adopted, the price in terms of religious
freedom must be measured. If that is not done, history may show that freedom
has been sent to the guillotine in the name of freedom. 176
Robert . Christians
176 This personification is borrowed from Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 599 (D.S.C.
1974).
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